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Abstract Corporate governance is often split between rule-
based and principle-based approaches to regulation in differ-
ent institutional contexts. This split is often informed by the
types of institutional configurations, their strengths, and the
complementarities within them. This approach to corporate
governance regulation is mostly discussed in the context of
developed economies and their regulatory demands. How-
ever, in developing and weak market economies, such as in
Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no such explicit split and the
debates on such contexts in the comparative corporate gov-
ernance literature have been meagre. Nonetheless, there are
sparks of good corporate governance practices in the region.
Drawing from institutional theory and a case study of a largest
economy, we explore the appropriateness or suitability of
corporate governance regulatory frameworks in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Our findings suggest that Nigeria needs an integrated
system that combines elements of both rule-based and prin-
ciple-based regulation, supported by a multi-stakeholder co-
regulation strategy. This paper departs from the mainstream
rule-based and principle-based categorisations by forging
ahead new perspectives on corporate governance regulation,
especially in weak market economies.
Keywords Corporate governance  Sub-Saharan Africa
(Nigeria)  Principles-based  Rule-based  Co-regulation 
Institutional theory  Culture
Introduction
The suitability of corporate governance systems in differ-
ent countries is mainly linked to the robustness of their
underlying regulatory mechanisms (Shrives and Brennan
2015). Corporate governance systems are also often
assessed on either principle-based or rule-based perspec-
tives (Sama and Shoaf 2005; Arjoon 2006; Black 2008).
Principle-based corporate governance codes are voluntary/
non-binding set of recommendations, standards, and best
practices, issued by a collective body, in relation to the
governance of corporations within a country (Chizema
2008; Osemeke and Adegbite 2016). Rule-based systems,
however, create more avenues for government to intervene
in corporate governance by coming up with stricter laws
which must be adhered to (Adegbite et al. 2011). The lit-
erature on principle-based and rule-based regulations have
mainly focused on understanding which of the regulatory
approaches are better in different conditions (see Arjoon
2006; Benston et al. 2006). For instance, while Arjoon
(2006) highlights the drawbacks of an excessive reliance
on rule-based regulatory approach, Black (2008) explained
that the global economic crisis of 2008 has exposed the
failings of a principle-based regulatory approach.
In contributing to this debate, we note that the adoption
of a principle-based or rule-based regulatory approach in a
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country is not necessarily informed by their inherent
characteristics but the peculiarities of the institutional
environment in that country. For example, Carmona and
Trombetta (2008) indicated that accounting traditions and
institutional conditions represent key variables influencing
the adoption of a particular approach towards corporate
governance regulation. This view is particularly important
in examining the appropriateness of corporate governance
regulatory approaches in Sub-Saharan African countries,
which are challenged, amongst others, by weak corporate
governance, poor disclosure and transparency, as well as
fragmented relationships between shareholders and stake-
holders (Okeahalam and Akinboade 2003; Okpara 2010).
However, what remains unknown is how corporate gover-
nance in sub-Saharan African economies should be regulated,
especially in a country like Nigeria, where both rule-based and
principle-based regulations are co-existing, and yet there is a
lack of market confidence in corporate governance regulatory
quality (Okike 2007; Inyang 2009; Osemeke and Adegbite
2016). Hence, we are guided by the research question: how
should corporate governance in Nigeria be regulated?
Our focus in this paper is to explore the most suit-
able approach to corporate governance regulation in the
largest African economy—Nigeria. The choice of Nigeria
is informed by variety of factors. First, Nigeria is at the
forefront of corporate governance research and develop-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ahunwan 2002; Okike 2007;
Amao and Amaeshi 2008; Amaeshi and Amao 2009;
Adegbite et al. 2013); hence her corporate governance
regulation is critical to the emergence of a robust corporate
governance system within the Sub-Saharan African region.
Second, the continued capacity of Nigeria and the region to
attract investments is linked to necessary improvements in
corporate governance regulation (Adelopo et al. 2009;
Adeoye 2009). Yet, it is well documented that Nigeria is
marred by weak corporate governance regulation and
infractions (ROSC 2004; Okike and Adegbite 2012).1
However, previous studies have mainly stopped at high-
lighting some of these corporate governance regulatory
challenges, without providing fundamentally new per-
spectives for regulating corporate governance in weak
institutional contexts. This is what we offer in this paper.
We present a model of regulation for corporate governance
in developing economies which share economic and insti-
tutional characteristics similar to those of Nigeria.
Consequently, we make two principal contributions. The
first proposes an alternative integrated approach for regu-
lating corporate governance in Nigeria, whereas the second
recommends co-regulation involving the government and
corporations in the country’s corporate governance system.
The insights we share regarding these are useful in
understanding corporate governance regulation in different
institutional contexts and help augment the nascent litera-
ture on corporate governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
rest of this paper proceeds by reviewing relevant literature
on corporate governance regulation to underpin our theo-
retical framework and our examination of the state of
corporate governance in Nigeria. Thereafter, the method-
ology of this study is presented, followed by the discussion
of our findings. We then summarise our key contributions
and suggest some areas for future studies.
Literature Review, Theoretical Underpinning,
and Research Agenda
Corporate governance does not only involve a set of rela-
tionships between a company’s management, its board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders, but also provides the
structure through which the objectives of the company are
set, and the means of accomplishing those objectives and
monitoring performance are determined (OECD 1999,
2004). Given this broad understanding of corporate gov-
ernance, one would expect that the attainment of such
objectives requires an encompassing corporate governance
regulatory framework. The task of developing such a
framework is an important, yet difficult one. As Andrea-
dakis (2008) questions, who will regulate the conduct of all
the actors in the corporate governance field to ensure that
predetermined goals are realised?
Regulation is central to the practice of corporate gover-
nance. Bruno and Claessens (2007) analysed a large number
of corporations across different countries to understand how
corporate governance practices in a company and the
country’s regulatory system interact to influence the com-
pany’s valuation. While their study indicates that corporate
governance plays an important role in ensuring efficient
company monitoring and promoting corporate value, they
show that the varying levels of regulation among countries
informed the contrasting degree of corporate governance
practices among countries (see also Roe 2003).
According to Just and Latzer (2004) as well as Cave
(2013), corporate governance regulation can be viewed as
occurring in a spectrum with four types including: No-
regulation, self-regulation, co-regulation and statutory
regulation (see Fig. 1). They propose that an appropriate
regulatory framework must be established along this
spectrum. Furthermore, the adoption of either principle-
based (self-regulation) or rule-based (statutory) regulation
must not only be in consonance with relevant institutional
settings but should also fit with the regulatory strategy
embraced in an institutional environment.
1 Recent corporate governance failures in Nigeria include scandals at
Cadbury, Unilever, Siemens, Haliburton as well as the banking crisis
which led to the collapse of several banks (Okike and Adegbite 2012).
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Accordingly, the country’s institutional arrangements
influence its corporate governance regulation (Aguilera and
Jackson 2003; Filatotchev et al. 2013). While the agency
theory has been considered as the supranational lens for
evaluating corporate governance issues (Lubatkin et al.
2007), Guiso et al. (2009) contend that cultural and insti-
tutional specificities are generally omitted in the postula-
tion of the agency relationship. However, institutional
frameworks and efficiency are often embedded in cultures.
In demonstrating the linkage between national cultures and
institutions, Witt and Redding (2009) show that consider-
able variations in the rationale for defining the ideal
structure of an economy between German and Japanese
firms is informed by cultural effects on institutional ele-
ments. Furthermore, Tabellini (2008) noted that the func-
tioning of institutions is influenced by individual values
and convictions, which are outcomes of the dominant
culture in an institutional environment. Similarly, findings
in Guiso et al. (2006), Tabellini (2010) and Alesina and
Giuliano (2015) suggest that institutions are substantial
reflection of the main cultural disposition in an environ-
ment. Thus, culture is crucial to decisions regarding the
adoption of either self-regulation (principle-based) or
statutory regulation (rule-based) for corporate governance.
The rule-based approach, which provides the operating
basis for Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) in the US, for
example, directs that compliance is mandatory for opera-
tors (Sama and Shoaf 2005). Thus, companies are expected
to obey the legal requirements or risk a penalty (Tricker
2015). Rule-based regulations are not only clear and cer-
tain, thereby limiting potential ambiguities; they are gen-
erally more operational than principles (Burgemeestre et al.
2009). Despite the strengths of this approach, Seidman
(2004) noted that legal compliance with rule-based regu-
lation results in ever-increasing bureaucracies, which
although designed to enforce compliance, are often met by
cynicism by operators and by clever employees who seek
to undercut the system. Arjoon (2005) added that rule-
based regulation may not necessarily instil excellence,
largely because it is impossible for a particular legislation
to address all possible human infractions.
Alternatively, the principle-based approach, such as in
the UK, makes compliance voluntary (Black et al. 2007),
such that companies are expected to either comply or
explain where compliance cannot be achieved. Whilst the
principle-based approach can be likened to a code of ethics,
practitioners are still expected to justify the basis for
actions taken, in order to avoid a reaction from the market.
As this represents the capstone of the ‘comply-or-explain’
system (Shrives and Brennan 2015), the problem is that
explanations are not always good enough as too much
emphasis is placed on compliance with the requirement.
Furthermore, Sun et al. (2010) reported that corporate
managers in the UK use disclosure techniques to reduce the
probability that public policy actions will be taken against
their organisations. Black et al. (2007) also identified
several concerns associated with the principles-based sys-
tem to include lack of uncertainty, accountability issues,
blurring of distinction between minimum standards and
best practice, amongst others.
Notwithstanding the criticisms of these two regulatory
approaches, the application of rule-based or principles-
based governance systems presents a fundamental concern,
especially in the context of developing economies. This
No Regulation Self-Regulation Co-Regulation Statutory Regulation
No explicit controls on an 
organisation
Regulations are specified, 
administered and enforced 
by the regulated 
organisation(s)
Regulations are specified, 
administered and enforced 
by a combination of the 
state and the regulated 
organisation(s)
Regulations are specified, 
administered and enforced 
by the state
The Regulation Range
Fig. 1 Continuum of regulation. Source: Adapted from Just and Latzer (2004) and Cave (2013)
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relates to the fact that both approaches are features of the
Anglo-American cultural preferences expressed through
the common law2 legal system. As such, can both regula-
tory approaches of corporate governance be applied in
other legal jurisdictions (see Judge et al. 2008) with dif-
ferent socio-cultural preferences? Addressing this question,
particularly in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa where
there exists a ‘colonial’3 and ‘translated’4 preference for
civil law regimes, does provide an interesting proposition.
Even in common law environments, which are based on
case laws defined by precedents, can these case laws be
relied upon in the poorly translated legal environments of
Sub-Saharan Africa? Alternatively, can the use of both
systems of corporate governance regulation compensate for
the shortcomings of this legal institutional context?
Corporate governance regulation in Nigeria, for exam-
ple, is statutorily entrenched in the Companies and Allied
Matters Act (CAMA) (1990). Specific corporate gover-
nance regulation effectively commenced in Nigeria with
the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) Code (2003), which was principle-based and
applied to all listed companies. However, despite the pos-
itives established by the Code, its implementation and
enforcement were fraught with various challenges (Ofo
2010). Adegbite (2012) observed that the code relied on
inputs developed and more relevant in other institutional
climes. Adopting corporate governance guidelines which
are best suited to western and less corrupt countries in a
non-conducive environment can be ineffective (Soludo
2006; Okike 2007).
In their analysis, Adegbite and Nakajima (2011) con-
clude that the overall nature of the Nigeria’s national and
firm-level institutional environments are not complemen-
tary with good corporate governance principles in both
national and corporate/industry levels. Furthermore, the
peculiarity of the institutional environment was reinforced
in Abdullahi et al. (2010), which examined regulatory
responses to ethical abuses in Enron (USA) and Cadbury
(Nigeria). They reported that whereas severe punishments
were meted out to those involved in the Enron scandal,
same cannot be said in relation to Cadbury Nigeria owing
to factors linked to the weak regulatory institutions and
pervasive corruption levels. Munene (1995) also reports
that the institutional environment in Nigeria is charac-
terised by, among others, political patronage, dominant
cultural disposition and high level of moral hazard. These
weaknesses in the Nigerian institutional environment make
corporate law enforcement and self-regulatory initiatives,
for instance, perpetuated in idealism (Yakasai 2001;
Ahunwan 2002).
However, global developments and issues encountered
with the Nigerian SEC Code (2003) resulted in calls for a
review of the code. A revised version of the code was
released in 2011. It remained largely principle-based.
Notwithstanding, in the intervening period (between 2003
and 2011), some sectors developed codes which sought to
address the peculiarities of their respective industries (see
Table 1). The first of such codes was the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) Code (2006), which was mandatory for
banks; followed by the National Pension Commission Code
of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators
(2008) and the National Insurance Commission Corporate
Governance Code (2008), which were largely principle-
based.
Despite the comprehensiveness and numbers of these
codes, there has been mounting criticisms against some of
their provisions. For example, Adegbite (2012) noted that
there is no clarity as to whether the SEC Code (2011)
should be enforced as a rule-based or a principle-based
code, thereby leading to confusion. Ofo (2011) also high-
lighted the confusion created by the disguised use of both
approaches in corporate governance regulation in Nigeria.
Furthermore, Osemeke and Adegbite (2016) have called
for a combined corporate governance code due to the
multiplicity, confusion, and inter-regulatory conflict in
terms of compliance expectations with the existing differ-
ent codes. However, the framework of corporate gover-
nance regulation in Nigeria needs to be significantly clearer
to make a combined code effective in promoting firm
compliance and better governance practices. There is also
need to understand the challenges in embracing both rule-
based and principle-based approaches to take advantage of
the benefits inherent in both models.
Our research endeavour is informed by institutional
theory (Judge et al. 2008; Filatotchev and Boyd 2009;
Suddaby 2010). For our study, institutional theory helps
highlight the critical interaction between institutions and
individual self and character (Scott 2014). The theory
contends that performance is linked to how institutions
relate to individuals. This indicates that regulatory perfor-
mance, for instance, may be better understood by exploring
the association between legal institutions and the behaviour
2 ‘Common law’ refers to laws that are derived from custom and
judicial precedent rather than statutes.
3 It is important to highlight the influence of western colonisation on
Sub-Saharan African economic and political institutions. It has been
argued that these institutions are foreign to the region and sometimes
conflict with the original socio-cultural preferences of sub-continent
(Bra¨utigam and Knack 2004).
4 Borrowing from the innovation diffusion literature (e.g. Djelic
1998), it can be argued that the ‘modern’ socio-economic institutions
in Sub-Saharan Africa are translated, if not transposed, versions of
western institutions. Given that these institutions are not home-grown
they have continued to struggle to be embedded in Africa. A classic
example is the case of democracy, as a form of government, which
has not taken root despite over 60 years of political independence in
most African countries (see Cheeseman 2015).
F. Nakpodia et al.
123
of stakeholders. For instance, institutional theory predicts
that the influence of performance is greatest when institu-
tionalisation is low (Kraatz and Zajac 1996). ‘Performance’
as used in Kraatz and Zajac (1996) could represent variety
of elements which include individuals. Therefore,
employing the conceptualisation in Kraatz and Zajac
(1996), the regulatory challenges in Nigeria, stimulated by
the increasing influence of key stakeholders, might be
explained by the weak legal institutions in the country.
This development means that regulatory frameworks are
exposed to the growing power and influence of key
stakeholders. ROSC (2004) consented that institutional
weaknesses represents a major challenge to corporate
governance regulation in Nigeria. Generating insights into
how corporate governance should be regulated in Nigeria
will contribute towards addressing the foregoing concern.
Methodology
We adopted a qualitative, interpretivist approach. Here, we
considered reality as the outcome of social construction
and interaction (see Berger and Luckmann 1966). Conse-
quently, we sought an understanding of corporate gover-
nance regulation in Nigeria based on the perceptions of key
stakeholders in relation to institutional influences. The
subjective perceptions of people helped to provide a rich
and valuable source of information to our research inquiry
(Bryman 2015). The differences in individuals and their
corresponding perceptions therefore support the multiple
reality view, which is consistent with the interpretivist
research.
As such, it was crucial to identify a data collection
technique that was consistent with qualitative and inter-
pretivist studies. Patton (2002, p. 89) noted that there is a
very practical side to qualitative (research) methods that
simply involves asking open-ended questions of people…in
real-world settings in order to solve problems. This high-
lights the relationship between interpretive research and the
use of interviews. Interviews allowed us to ask our research
participants a series of questions which supported the
collection of an in-depth and nuanced qualitative data
(Denscombe 2010; Easterby-Smith et al. 2012).
In this study, in-depth interviews were conducted over a
two-month period in the third quarter of 2013 using the
semi-structured technique. Semi-structured interviews,
according to Bryman (2015), refers to a context wherein
the interviewer asks a series of questions that are in the
general form of an ‘interview guide,’ but with the inter-
viewer having the independence to vary the sequence of the
questions. This approach, while encouraging a two-way
communication, offered us more latitude to ask further
questions as a reaction to what is considered a significant
response. Thus information generated from our semi-
structured interviews did not only provide us answers, but
also offered reasons for those answers (Flick 2014). Our
methodology is consistent with previous studies on cor-
porate governance regulation in Nigeria (Osemeke and
Adegbite 2016).
On sampling and sample size, participants were drawn
from the Nigerian business environment who were familiar
with corporate governance regulation policies. They
include corporate executives, regulators and corporate
governance consultants. Executives (corporate board
members) were selected from companies listed on the
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and regulators were
selected from some of the principal corporate governance
regulatory institutions in Nigeria (NSE, SEC and the CBN).
It is also important to highlight that sample size issues in
qualitative research are often influenced by ‘saturation’5
concerns. A considerable volume of literature in qualitative
research suggests that ‘how many’ is not what matters
(Mason 2010; Burmeister and Aitken 2012). A researcher
should therefore aim to satisfy himself/herself that he/she
has learned, and understands the phenomenon, enough to
Table 1 Corporate governance codes in Nigeria. Source: Authors
Corporate governance codes Year of
introduction
Relevant
industry
Principles-based
or rule-based?
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code (replaced) 2003 All Industries Largely principles
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code 2006 Banking Mainly rules
National Pension Commission (PENCOM) Code of Corporate Governance
for Licensed Pension Operators
2008 Pensions Largely principles
National Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Corporate Governance Code 2009 Insurance Largely principles
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code (revised) 2011 All Industries Largely principles
5 Saturation is achieved when the collection of new data does not
shed any further light on the object being studied (Glaser and Strauss
1967). Saturation is fundamentally a grounded theory construct,
however Mason (2010) suggested it can be adopted as a guiding
principle during data collection.
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enable knowledge generation. This was our basis for
determining sample size (see Pope et al. 2000; Mason
2010).
Given that the authors have substantial corporate and
research experience in Nigeria, participants with the req-
uisite profile were contacted via emails and telephone calls,
outlining the research agenda. Regarding personal contacts,
it is worth noting that Nigeria, according to Hofstede et al.
(2010), is mainly a collectivist society.6 This opportunity
allowed the authors to engage the snowballing technique,
which proved beneficial in gaining access to high-calibre
respondents (Denscombe 2010; Stigliani and Ravasi 2012).
As a result, 21 interviews were conducted until saturation
was achieved.
It is necessary to state that three stakeholder groups
participated in this study namely corporate executives
(denoted by ‘E’), regulators (represented by ‘R’), and
corporate governance consultants, mostly academics (des-
ignated by ‘C’). The selection of these participants was
informed by two main reasons. First, existing corporate
governance regulations in Nigeria, especially the SEC
Codes 2003 and 2011, have benefitted from the inputs of
these three categories of respondents. Secondly, the desire
to generate broad and rich insights regarding the study
objectives compels the integration of a wide variety of
stakeholders. The profiles of the participants are provided
in Table 2.
The data collected for this study was analysed using the
qualitative content analysis technique which allowed for the
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through a
systematic classification process of coding and identifying
themes or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Unlike the
conventional (quantitative) content analysis, Schreier (2012)
affirms that qualitative content analysis is not restricted to
frequency counts. Rather, as Mayring (2000) suggests,
qualitative content analysis provides amedium for exploring
core themes. These features, in addition to its considerable
link with interpretivist features (see Flick 2014) were crucial
to its adoption in this study. Relying on a model proposed in
Elo and Kynga¨s (2008), we adopt a three step model to
explore, classify and understand our data.
The first stage of our data analysis involved generating
the sub-categories through making sense of the data, fol-
lowed by an open coding procedure. This stage ensured
that the many words of the transcribed material are clas-
sified into much smaller content categories (Weber 1990).
This process generated themes which represent the sub-
categories, such as capacity of regulators, dearth of
knowledge, cultural issues, as some factors which
undermine corporate governance regulation in Nigeria. The
second stage of analysis involved the generation of generic
categories where the sub-categories are grouped under
higher order headings (Burnard 1991). The objective of this
stage was to reduce the number of sub-categories by col-
lapsing those that are similar or dissimilar into broader
higher order categories (Dey 2003). In the final stage, an
abstraction procedure was followed to generate an overall
description of the research problem (Polit and Beck 2012).
This stage resulted in the main category. ‘‘Appendix’’
presents the key themes that emerged from our data, which
provide insights into our research inquiry on how to reg-
ulate corporate governance in Nigeria.
Findings and Discussions
Our data show that corporate governance regulation in
Nigeria is fraught with inter-related challenges at both
micro and macro levels, in line with institutional theoreti-
cal framework analysis. Macro-level factors describe the
problems stimulated by societal distinctiveness, where
corporate governance regulations have been impacted by
morality and principle issues. The micro-level factors
relate to the apathy and regulatory indifference which
influence the attitude of key stakeholders towards regula-
tions. We discuss these next, with supporting extracts from
our anonymised data (E1–E9; R1–R8; C1–C4).
Macro-level Issues: Societal Collective Moral
Consciousness, Enlightenment and Perceived
Colonial Culture Concerns
As indicated in ‘‘Appendix’’, a generic category that
emerged from the analysis, as a governance concern,
relates to the belief system and moral principles of stake-
holders—i.e. the societal collective moral consciousness
and enlightenment. E7 noted that;
You know, the SEC code is driven by principles. I
think this is where the problem lies. The use of
principles will only work when the people are
enlightened and display strong morals. But here in
this country, most people are illiterate and poor,
hence there is a lack of knowledge and a lack of
awareness of corporate governance, and the capacity
to remain morally upright is weak.
In addition, the challenge of corporate governance regula-
tion in Nigeria is compounded by low literacy levels. As
noted by E3;
The importance of corporate governance is not fully
understood or well appreciated by the majority of
6 Collectivism describes a society that embodies a tightly knit
framework where individuals can expect their relatives or group
members to provide for them in exchange for absolute loyalty.
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stakeholders. I think this has also lead to a situation
where people are not really interested in corporate
governance. I actually know some people who
believe that pursuing corporate governance could
create additional burden on their organisational
finances.
Adegbite et al. (2012) infer that owing to low literacy
levels, many shareholders are generally ignorant of
their rights hence they prefer to remain passive (see
also Uche et al. 2016). This increases the possibility of
governance breaches by executives as the market fails
to respond appropriately to their infractions. Indeed, in
countries such as Nigeria, information asymmetry
remains a concern (see Okpara 2010; Oyadonghan and
Ogiriki 2014). This consequently undermines the
robustness of a principle-based regulatory approach
which relies on the market, to react to observed
governance infractions.
Despite these interpretations, one could argue that these
are collective manifestations of ill-suited Anglo-American
culture of short-termism prevalent in the Nigerian system.
E7 alludes to it;
The business community and in the country as a
whole, we are short-term oriented. We are always
focused on short-term gains. If (stakeholders) know
that they will be disadvantaged in the short term, they
would not engage in (infractions).
In relation to E7’s comment above, R2, a regulator, added
that;
I think the major problem of our regulation is that it
bears the mark of our colonial masters. To be honest,
when it comes to corporate governance, Nigerians
perceive it differently compared to the British people.
So, as long as these regulations largely resemble
those of Britain, it is not likely to be effective for the
people in this country.
Similar observations were noted by E3, E4, R5 and C3.
Solomon (2013) argues that, from an institutional theory
perspective, compliance with a code could be resisted,
especially where the code originates from a foreign country
with a different culture and environment. This resistance
can result in ‘decoupling.’7 In essence, a code may not
necessarily lack the capacity to address corporate gover-
nance concerns but institutional factors such as culture
could undermine the functionality of the code. Rwegasira
(2000) also emphasised that corporate governance, espe-
cially in African economies, will continue to experience
challenges until measures are taken to adapt the gover-
nance model to acknowledge the peculiarities of specific
economies. Indeed, comments from participants (E5, E8,
R6, R7 and C4) indicate that some issues of governance in
Nigeria border on the perception of corporate governance
as a foreign concept. This concern emerges from the view
that the codes are ‘imported’ from foreign countries, hence
they lack the capacity to address, in particular, the cultural
specificities of an ethnically diverse country such as
Nigeria. E8 admits that;
… the problem of the codes is that they failed to
integrate our own culture because it was imported
from abroad. So people will not identify with it.
These codes do not address our local cultural
peculiarities.
Participants were unanimous in suggesting that the
practice of corporate governance in Nigeria has been
hampered by this development. In addition, morality and
principles are also impacted by the dominant cultural
affiliations of stakeholders. For instance, whereas C3 stated
that ‘‘you cannot separate people from their culture’’, E6
commented that;
Culture …plays a very significant role in all that we
(Nigerians) do. Our culture determines how we
accept and react to issues, even economic issues. I
personally think our cultural values and affiliations
bear the greatest impact on the actions of at least, the
majority of Nigerians.
In corporate governance discourse, there is evidence
(Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Licht et al. 2005) to suggest that
Table 2 Profiles of participants
Stakeholder group Career background Total
Law Finance/accounting Economics Buss. & Mgt
Corporate executives 1 3 2 3 9
Regulators 2 2 1 3 8
Consultants 1 1 0 2 4
Total 4 6 3 8 21
7 Decoupling’ describes where actual behaviour of members of an
organisation frequently does not reflect official accounts (Scott 2014).
There is apparent compliance with codes, but there is no genuine
organisational change in practice (Solomon 2013). A participant
described this development as ‘technical compliance’.
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corporate governance has been influenced by a dominant
culture. Similar conclusions have been reported in Nigeria.
Oghojafor et al. (2012), whilst describing the relationship
between corporate governance and national culture as Si-
amese twins, noted that national culture plays a crucial role
in the efficacy of corporate governance. Some other works
(Ite 2004; Amaeshi et al. 2006) suggest that the implication
of culture upon corporate governance practices in Nigeria
is substantial. This view was alluded to by a majority of the
participants, as they indicated that culture has strong
implications for corporate governance in Nigeria. How-
ever, the majority of the participants opined that the
dominant cultural values in contemporary Nigerian society
are not consistent with the principles of corporate
governance.
Micro-level Issues: Individuals’ and Firms’ Apathy
and Indifference to Regulations and Practice
of Regulatory Avoidance
The foregoing contributes to the general apathy of stake-
holders towards regulations. Participants indicated that
problems bordering on compliance and enforcement of
regulations, the regulatory power of regulators, political
influence, corruption levels and the ability to manipulate
the legal system by influential stakeholders have height-
ened the apathy and indifference of operators towards
regulations. E1 highlighted the challenge that emerges
when stakeholders show apathy towards regulations. This
challenge was noted in Ahunwan (2002). C1 explained
that;
From my experience, it is widely known that many
so-called operators have never really sat down to look
at the SEC code even the 2003 version. As a result,
they don’t even know what is expected of them and
cannot perform.
Furthermore, there are inherent challenges at the micro-
level, especially with reference to the ability of individuals
and firms to undermine compliance and enforcement
through corrupt practices. R1 explained that;
It is far too easy to avoid compliance in this country
as long as the individual or organisation is willing to
offer gratification. You know, same thing also applies
to the enforcement strategies for corporate gover-
nance. Generally, enforcement of the regulation is
weak and there is no accountability. There are actu-
ally cases where regulators also help to facilitate
these problems.
Emenyonu (2007) traced the emergence of the issues raised
by C1 and R1 to micro-institutional deficiencies which
have subsequently given rise to a growing number of
Nigerians who are able to ignore the provisions of the
country’s laws to perpetrate corporate corruption. As the
foregoing perception suggests that Nigerians display apa-
thy towards regulations, Adegbite (2012) added that the
weaknesses in regulatory institutions have been exploited
by individuals and firms to create this attitude. Okpara
(2011) agreed that a strict enforcement regime is likely to
force compliance. This is consistent with the view of R6;
The code should be made mandatory (with the)
introduction of stronger enforcement mechanisms,
(fortified) with (tougher) sanctions.
Thus, whilst the use of regulations has appeared ineffec-
tual, it is possible that a sound regulatory regime,
strengthened with commensurate enforcement strategies,
could change the attitude of Nigerians at the micro-level
towards regulatory policies. Thus, a rule-based system with
an appropriate sanction strategy might generate better
results, as it minimises the possibility for misinterpretation
and misunderstanding (Sama and Shoaf 2005) at the micro-
level.
Furthermore, the desire to circumvent regulations and
pursue economic alternatives that would yield financial
benefits for operators reflects a desire to achieve, but only
in the short term. The adoption of a principle-based
approach could accelerate short-termism, as it allows firms
to seek voluntary compliance to corporate governance
codes (Adegbite 2012).
A participant (E4) also noted the prevalence of ‘tech-
nical compliance’ rather than substantive compliance
amongst Nigerian organisations, observing that;
You can always secure technical compliance with
corporate governance by satisfying the (require-
ments) but there is still a long way to go in adopting
the underlying values and principles which drives
corporate governance. For instance, it is easier to find
a director who satisfies the definition of ‘‘indepen-
dent’’ but is he really independent?
Technical compliance suggests an adherence to the letter of
the code but as Sama and Shoaf (2005) observe, technical
compliance inadvertently undermines the promotion of the
very spirit of the code—a classic case of regulatory
avoidance. Consequently, in such environments, adherence
to ‘soft laws’ (Black 2008) is bound to experience
challenges. This was supported by C2;
I do not see a principle-based regulation working in
this country. At least not now. The behaviour of
many Nigerians will not allow the use of principles-
based regulation to succeed. A strict sanction strat-
egy, which you may liken to rules, will be more
(appropriate). In my opinion, that is what we need.
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These concerns provide the rationale for exploring the rule-
based and the principle-based approaches to regulation in
the context of Nigeria.
Neither Principles Nor Rules: Which Direction
for Nigeria?
From the two generic categories discussed above, there is a
need to modify the regulatory mechanism for corporate
governance in Nigeria. Though the Anglo-American sys-
tem has influenced the regulation of corporate governance
in Nigeria, the model appears to be specifically suited to
systems where institutional frameworks are robust enough
to check the behaviour of economic actors. As previously
noted, the control of corporations is influenced by social
relations and existing institutional arrangements (Aguilera
and Jackson 2003). Thus, the institutional environment
must be accounted for prior to and during the establishment
of corporate governance systems in developing economies
(Rwegasira 2000).
In addition, Mangena et al. (2012) demonstrate that the
performance of a corporate board, for example, is depen-
dent on the firm’s environment. A firm’s environment tends
to reflect the dominant national culture. This suggests that
the search for a suitable corporate governance system must
integrate cultural distinctiveness. Thus, in countries such as
Nigeria, the regulation of corporate governance must be
established and implemented based not only on an under-
standing that such regulatory interventions must not only
recognise the peculiarities of the institutional environments
but also its main cultural influences.
Consequently, such regulatory intervention must not
only have the capacity to tackle the concerns identified in
the sub-categories (see ‘‘Appendix’’), but must be robust
and enduring, in order to address corporate governance
concerns over the long term. Ofo (2010) traced the origin
of the governance problem in Nigeria to the lack of a
distinct regulatory system. In the SEC Code (2011), Ofo
(2011) noted that the inability of regulators to clearly
position the code either as a rule-based or principles-based
regulation creates misunderstanding and confusion in the
application of the code by stakeholders. While the SEC
Code (2011) notes that it aims to ensure that its provisions
are enforceable, it further indicates that;
The code is not intended as a rigid set of rules. It is
expected to be viewed and understood as a guide to
facilitate sound corporate practices and behaviour
(Section 1.3a).
It can be claimed that the view above is significantly
indicative of a substantial leaning towards a principles-
based approach. One can therefore argue that even as the
SEC Code has a preference for a principles-based
regulation, there is an understanding that this may not
lead to desired compliance and governance standard.
Schwarcz (2009) posits that principle-based regulation is
thought to more closely achieve normative goals than rules,
but added that the extent to which this occurs depends on
the enforcement strategy. In Nigeria, Adegbite (2012)
noted that regulation and enforcement are at variance. This
position is consistent with the views of the majority of
participants.
We previously highlighted the problem with a principle-
based regulatory approach, stressing that the prevalent low
levels of morality and literacy as well as high poverty
levels have meant that issues of ethics and morality are
constantly challenged, especially in view of its normative
nature and intangibility. These issues informed R8’s
comment;
Principle-based (regulation) may not work in Nigeria.
The institutional environment does not support it. It is
difficult to do business (in Nigeria) based on
principles.
This suggests that principle-based regulation may lack the
capacity to foster the entrenchment of a robust corporate
governance system thus compelling the development of an
alternative regulatory strategy. An alternative will be rule-
based strategy or the stick approach (Arjoon 2005). There
is a consensus among stakeholders noting that corporate
governance compliance and enforcement in the Nigerian
banking sector have been commendable, owing substan-
tially to the CBN’s regulatory approach. Indeed, whereas
E7 noted that ‘sectors such as the banking sector have a
higher level of compliance,’ the reason for this develop-
ment, as observed by E5 is connected to the fact that
corporate governance regulation in the banking industry is
mandatory. C1 reinforces this view;
We can argue that the banks in Nigeria have the best
corporate governance practices because of the CBN
code of 2006 which is essentially rule-based.
E2 also commended the CBN for the improvement of
corporate governance among banks in Nigeria, agreeing
that the banking sector in the country is where the benefit
of effective corporate governance is most evident. Sec-
tion 1.7 of the CBN Code (2006) stipulates that:
Compliance with the provisions of this Code is
mandatory.
Clearly, the CBN Code, unlike its SEC counterpart, adopts
a rule-based regulatory strategy. The relative success
recorded in the banking sector with respect to corporate
governance (see Odeleye 2014) suggests that Nigerian
firms and stakeholders are more responsive to rules than
principles. In addition, the economic importance of the
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banking system, which demands a stringent oversight and
intervention by the government, may have informed the
relative achievements with regard to the CBN code.
In view of the above, it is proposed that corporate
governance regulation must substantially reflect a rule-
based approach. In other words, substantial elements of the
existing code should be updated to exhibit a rule-based
mechanism. There are benefits of pursuing this alternative.
First, if urgent steps must be taken to address the significant
governance challenges in the country, a rule-based regu-
latory system has been acknowledged to offer an attractive
reform strategy, especially in the short-term (Benston et al.
2006; Kim and Saito 2009). Thus, a rule-based approach
can be engaged as a ‘‘quick fix’’ to reposition governance
practices, in order to enhance its capacity to earn the
benefits of good corporate governance. This recommen-
dation is linked with the need to increase awareness of
corporate governance and to communicate a strong signal
that regulations are to be adhered to. As was the case with
the introduction of the CBN Code (2006), a substantially
rule-based regulation can drive corporate governance
awareness as operators increasingly desire to avoid expo-
sure to stiffer penalties.
Drawing from the foregoing, it is crucial to note that the
success of a rule-based mechanism is enhanced by the
extent to which sanctions are enforceable (Sama and Shoaf
2005). Thus, this study also proposes ‘‘certainty of
enforcement’’. Regulators must desist from setting aside
the enforcement mechanism for governance infractions
perpetrated by operators. The inability and lack of capacity
(on the part of regulators) to punish offenders have been
consistently highlighted as a major setback for corporate
governance regulation in many developing economies.
Therefore, legal loopholes which can be exploited by
operators must be identified and addressed to minimise the
potential of ‘‘exit’’ from prosecution. Certainty of
enforcement will also promote deterrence (Becker 1974).
In an institutional context with limited regard for princi-
ples, sanctions must be severe enough to discourage
infractions and unethical practices (Akers 1990; Ellis
2003). Black (2008) explained that with deterrence-based
approaches, tough and formal enforcement actions become
the norm. Therefore, sanctions must be designed such that
the benefits gained by engaging in governance infractions
cannot compensate for the penalty (Ellis 2003). Many
operators indeed undertake ‘‘cost-benefit analysis’’ before
reaching a decision to engage in ethical (or unethical)
practices. As such, the penalties need to be substantial in
order to encourage compliance.
However, we argue that it is difficult to realise the long-
term objectives of a robust corporate governance system
relying on a single approach. Despite the preference for a
rule-based regulation, this study recommends that the new
regulatory model must incorporate elements of the princi-
ple-based approach, thereby integrating relevant elements
of both approaches in a regulatory framework. This
proposition is to enable it take advantage of the benefits
inherent in a principles-based regulation which include
allowing for social sanctions to act as deterrents to uneth-
ical conduct (Sama and Shoaf 2005), the broadening of the
legal boundaries to issues not addressed by law (Arjoon
2006) and the emphasis on substantive compliance and less
on box-ticking or working out how to avoid rule in sub-
stance (creative compliance) (Black 2008). This is crucial
because rule-based, as proposed, is intended to offer a
short-term impact. The pursuit of good corporate gover-
nance is a ‘‘journey’’ (Madhani 2007) and the objective
must be to achieve good corporate governance in the long-
term. Arjoon (2005) stated that legal compliance, which is
the basis of a rule-based approach encourages letter of the
law which may not inspire excellence, but ethical com-
pliance which underlies principles-based approach pro-
motes the spirit of the law. Arjoon (2006) added that
principles-based regulation tends to be value-driven,
focuses on prevention and develops over the longer term.
Further reasons why an integrated framework is sug-
gested is that the nature of a rule-based system cannot
account for every possible infraction. A system centred on
principles possesses the mechanism to manage more
seemingly silent activities of humans as it relies on
morality, ethics and value. Whereas Trevino and Nelson
(2010) acknowledge this point, Sama and Shoaf (2005)
note that principles such as impartiality, transparency,
accountability, responsibility, truthfulness and respect for
rights are broader than the law, and hence may not be
accounted for in a rule-based system. The principles noted
in Sama and Shoaf (2005) are critical to an enduring cor-
porate governance system, hence a principle-based
approach must necessarily be incorporated in any corporate
governance regulatory framework. Therefore, whilst noting
that the institutional environment in Nigeria does not
support complete dependence on the principles-based or
rule-based approaches, an appropriate mix of both
approaches can generate better outcomes. C4 noted as
follows:
I see rule-based as a quick fix. Principles-based are
the best and more sustainable but it takes a long time
for its results to lead to real change in behaviour.
Maybe policy makers should be considering how to
use both (approaches).
C1 further highlights the complementarity of both
approaches;
… You know rules cannot (address) every issue.
Rules will only be able to attend to simple issues, but
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with principles you can attend to all issues whether
complex or simple. (which is only possible when
stakeholders) have internalized the (principles).
In line with the foregoing, we proceed to discuss the
implementation strategies of the integrated regulatory
approach on the basis of a multi-stakeholder co-regulation
framework.
Further Discussions
Implementing An Integrated Regulatory Approach
In this paper, we propose a shift from the present principle-
based regulatory structure of corporate governance in
Nigeria to a substantially rule-based approach. However,
this must follow a precise implementation pattern repre-
sented in Fig. 2, which reveals three phases towards the
establishment of an integrated regulatory approach. The
first phase proposes an entirely rule-based regulatory
framework whereas in the second phase, core elements of
principle-based regulation are gradually incorporated into
the existing regulatory framework. In the final phase, the
regulation increasingly reflects a principles-based
regulation.
In relation to the above, Black (2008) agreed that
adopting a principles-based or rule-based approach as an
extreme position is a suboptimal strategy to implement.
But Apampa (2014) questioned if a hybrid (a mix of
principles-based and rule-based) model is deemed appro-
priate, and where along the spectrum should the optimal
strategy lie? This is an important query which implies that
regulators should first seek to negotiate with operators
towards a consensual optimal strategy (Black 2008).
However, if this strategy does not yield expected compli-
ance levels, regulators should gradually move up the
enforcement pyramid whilst applying sanctions of
increasing severity (Black 2008). This process must con-
tinue until compliance levels are acceptable. It might then
be appropriate at this stage to embark on the second phase
(see ‘‘Appendix’’) which will entail the introduction of
more sustainable, principles-based regulatory approach.
This procedure signifies that the existing regulatory
approach will continue to change positions on the spectrum
until the desired outcomes are visible.
In the third phase in Fig. 2, the regulatory system will
gradually move from being a substantially rule-based
mechanism to a considerably principles-based regulation.
This strategy is proposed considering that principles-based
regulation not only emphasises a long-term view but also
possesses the capacity to address issues which lie beyond
the boundaries of a rule-based regulatory system (Sama
and Shoaf 2005; Arjoon 2006). The movement from one
phase to another must be the outcome of an assessment of
corporate governance by relevant stakeholders at different
points in time.
The Netherlands and South African corporate gover-
nance systems offer evidence of the potential of an
Rules-Based Regulation Rules-Based Regulation
Principles-
Based 
Regulation
Rules-
Based 
Regulation
Principles-Based 
Regulation
First Phase Second Phase Third Phase
Fig. 2 The integrated regulatory approach. Source: Authors
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integrated regulatory approach. In South Africa especially,
the Kings Report III opted for an ‘apply or explain’ regime
(Institute of Directors SA 2009) rather than the conven-
tional ‘comply or explain’ system. This is because the
‘apply or explain’ system acknowledges that it is not a case
of whether to comply or not, but emphasises how the
principles can be applied. Notably, the Institute of Direc-
tors SA (2009) admitted that in an ‘apply or explain’
regime, principles override specific recommended practices
but added that some principles have been legislated which
compels compliance with the letter of the law and removes
the incidence of subjective interpretations. Thus, whereas
the foregoing offers evidence that the ‘apply or explain’
approach integrates the elements of rule-based and princi-
ples-based approaches, it crucially gives some power to
corporate boards. For instance, where a board believes it is
in the best interest of the company, it can adopt a practice
different from that recommended by King III but the
practice must be explained. According to the Institute of
Directors SA (2009), the change became necessary to
address peculiarities of the South African business envi-
ronment. This reinforces the view that countries should
pursue policies which serve their best interest. Hence, it is
proposed that a rule-based system be established in the
Nigerian code, in the short term. Subsequently, a princi-
ples-based regulatory regime must be gradually integrated
into the framework. In this study, the regulatory framework
integrating elements of the principles-based and rule-based
approaches is regarded as the integrated approach to cor-
porate governance regulation.
A Multi-stakeholder Co-Regulation Strategy
Having recommended a regulatory approach for corporate
governance in Nigeria, it is necessary to offer further
insights that would enhance the functionality of the pro-
posed integrated regulatory framework. Generally, regula-
tions, according to Adegbite (2012), are produced by
agencies with the commensurate power and authority to
induce compliance by operators. As a result, regulations
could be viewed by operators as unfair owing substantially
to their coercive nature. This perception tends to have
consequences for compliance. This challenge is more
pronounced in a country like Nigeria where the govern-
ment has been repeatedly accused of not abiding by the
provisions of existing regulations, thus providing a ratio-
nale for corporations to also seek ways (albeit illegitimate)
to evade compliance. The nature of this challenge in the
Nigerian business environment dictates that an alternative
strategy be proposed for the integrated regulatory approach
to achieve desired objectives.
Co-regulation involves a system wherein government
and firms share responsibility for drafting and enforcing
regulatory standards (Hirsch 2011). Co-regulation is nei-
ther purely a government regulation nor purely an industry
self-regulation, but a hybrid of both (Hirsch 2011). Kirk-
bride and Letza (2004) suggested that corporate gover-
nance regulation has taken a significant new direction.
They explained that the boundaries of regulation are no
longer determined by the choice between market-based
(self) regulation and state-based (statutory) regulation but
by a process of collibration.8 The benefit of this approach,
according to Hirsch (2011), is that it ensures collaboration
between government and businesses, leading to improved
government-industry relationships, making both units
problem-solvers.
However, the general view of co-regulation focuses
mainly on cooperation between companies and govern-
ment. Whilst this form of co-regulation is termed ‘co-
governance’ or ‘collaborative governance’ (Hirsch 2011),
this paper proposes a multi-stakeholder form of co-regu-
lation, which implies the relationship between business and
its stakeholders in developing corporate governance regu-
lation (Albareda 2008). This expands the frontier of cor-
porate governance regulation beyond businesses and
government. The main rationale for the proposed regula-
tory strategy is informed by concerns regarding the
industry-government relationship which occurs beyond the
public view. This could yield one-sided outcomes which
fail to protect other stakeholders (Hirsch 2011).
We present our model to frame co-regulation for cor-
porate governance in Nigeria in Fig. 3. The model indi-
cates that dialogue between businesses and stakeholders
generates a negotiated regulation which is consistent with
the expectations of the parties involved. This ensures joint
responsibility amongst stakeholders in administering and
enforcing corporate governance regulations.
Summary
In this paper, we have examined the existing regulatory
approach for corporate governance in Nigeria. We
acknowledge that corporate governance regulation in
Nigeria has been pursued largely using the principle-based
approach. Our discussions reveal that some of the problems
of corporate governance in Nigeria, such as corruption, the
cultural belief system and the dearth of knowledge, among
others, are inconsistent with the application of principles.
The adoption of a principle-driven regulatory approach is
enhanced where information flows freely in the system and
8 Collibration describes the process of government intervention in
order to recognise a balance between its objectives and those of the
market with a view to managing the balance such that government
policy objectives are realised (Kirkbride and Letza 2004).
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institutional elements are robust (Arjoon 2005; Tariq and
Abbas 2013; Uche et al. 2016). Indeed, as indicated by
interviewees, the business environment in Nigeria, as pre-
sently constituted, does not support the economic and
social sophistication required to accommodate a principles-
based corporate governance regulatory regime. As a result,
it was necessary to propose an alternative regulatory
strategy for corporate governance in Nigeria to enhance its
capacity to engender an effective corporate governance
system.
To this effect, an integrated regulatory approach that
integrates the appropriate elements of a rule-based and a
principle-based approach is proposed. Considering the
need to promptly improve corporate governance practice in
Nigeria, commencing the new regulatory approach with the
rule-based or ‘stick approach’ (Arjoon 2005) is considered
necessary. However, in view of its prior discussed limita-
tions, this approach should be engaged only in the short
term. In fact, the approach should be changed as soon as
improvements in corporate governance practice are
observed. The second (final) stage of implementing the
proposed regulation will integrate the principles-based
regulatory approach. The efficient mix of appropriate ele-
ments of both systems will be subsequently engaged to
manage corporate governance in Nigeria, over the long
term. We termed this ‘the integrated regulatory approach to
corporate governance.’ This approach allows the principles
and rules based regulatory systems to sufficiently reinforce
each other to generate optimal outcomes in respect of
corporate governance.
To strengthen the application of the integrated regula-
tory approach, a multi-stakeholder co-regulation was also
suggested to enhance corporate governance regulation in
Nigeria. The benefits of co-regulation are numerous. It
reflects a long-term orientation and allows organisations to
better acknowledge the effect of non-compliance on col-
laborators (Steurer 2013). Furthermore, in a highly
dynamic market environment such as Nigeria, co-regula-
tion offers a rapid and flexible response to changes in
market conditions. It is also important to state that in view
of the confusing provisions in some corporate codes in
Nigeria, the use of co-regulation could generate a regula-
tory framework acceptable to all stakeholders, thus min-
imising these confusions.
Contributions, Limitations and Future Research
We make two main contributions. The first proposes an
alternative integrated approach for regulating corporate
governance in Nigeria. The engagement of an alternative
regulatory system for corporate governance not only
highlights the variations in institutional environments, but
also necessitates a review of the fundamental positions of
institutional theory of corporate governance. In Judge et al.
(2008), institutions are expected to regulate economic
behaviours, as a strategy for building durable corporate
governance systems. This framework has been severally
adopted to examine the relationship between institutions
and corporate governance (Aguilera and Jackson 2003;
Filatotchev et al. 2013).
Business Stakeholders
Government
Dialogue The Public
Employees
Negotiated Corporate 
Governance Regulations
Fig. 3 Multi-stakeholder co-regulation
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Unfortunately, this framework might not yield desired
outcomes in environments where influential actors in the
political and social domains can leverage their resources to
create new institutions or transform/influence the func-
tionality of existing ones (Maguire et al. 2004). While this
concern is acknowledged in Nigeria, it offers further jus-
tification for the need to craft an alternative regulatory
regime for corporate governance in the country that has the
potential to check the activities of stakeholders in the
corporate governance environment. Therefore, despite the
view that there is a relationship between weak institutional
environments and poor corporate governance regulation
(Gourevitch 2003; Estache and Wren-Lewis 2009; Siddiqui
2010), evidence from this paper, taking into account the
implementation of the rule-based CBN Code (2006), pre-
sents a different outcome.
In essence, there are sparks of good corporate gover-
nance practices in regions where this is unexpected. This
deserves more attention in future research. Our study
takes account of peculiar institutional factors and limita-
tions, and engages the macro- and micro-level issues
identified by participants to propose a hybrid framework
for corporate governance regulation, inculcating both
principles and rules. In doing this, we acknowledge that
Nigeria presently lacks the necessary institutional capacity
to adopt either a principles-based or a rule-based approach
to corporate governance. These approaches are intended
to be reinforcing, to enable the corporate governance
system in Nigeria to take advantage of both regulatory
mechanisms.
Our second contribution recommends co-regulation
involving the government and corporations in the coun-
try’s corporate governance system. The insights we share
regarding these are useful in understanding corporate
governance regulation in different institutional contexts
and help augment the nascent literature on corporate
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This hybrid co-regu-
lation strategy, involving the state and firms, will aid the
accomplishment of a more effective integrated regulation.
As a largely government-sector driven economy, regula-
tions have consistently remained the sole preserve of
government. This paper demonstrates that increased
involvement of organisations in the regulatory develop-
ment is crucial to improved corporate governance in
Nigeria.
In generating our findings, it is necessary to highlight a
methodological limitation of this study. We note that data
respondents were not drawn from all sectors of the Nige-
rian economy as classified by the NSE, thereby limiting the
extent to which we can generalise the outcomes of this
study. However, participants also included consultants who
have undertaken various corporate governance-related
roles in the economic sectors not represented by partici-
pants. As a result, the findings of this study offer significant
analytic generalisability (see Yin 2013) in understanding
the determinants of corporate governance regulation in
different institutional contexts (Adegbite 2015). Nonethe-
less, future research can rely on a more extensive and
representative sample. Finally, it is worth mentioning that
governance practices amongst state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) have been generally neglected in studies on cor-
porate governance in developing countries, such as Nige-
ria. This is particularly worrisome as SOEs in Nigeria, for
instance, are central to the present state of corporate gov-
ernance practices (Okike 2007; Kajola 2008). Conse-
quently, future studies may evaluate the regulatory
dynamics of corporate governance in SOEs and how it
influences the practice of corporate governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa.
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